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I. INTRODUCTION
Courts in recent years have been struggling to deal with the tension
building between the widespread public policy that supports arbitration and
Supreme Court precedent that continues to emphasize the importance of class
wide actions in "small-stakes" claims.' Although support for arbitration
continues to grow based on the influence of the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA),2 courts are also cognizant that class wide action may be the only
viable option for the. vindication of a claim in many cases.3 In 2004, the
Seventh Circuit explained, "the realistic alternative to a class action is not 17
million individual suits, but zero individual suits as only a lunatic or fanatic
sues for $30."4
One issue in these cases that remains unanswered is when are the costs
for a single claim so prohibitive so as to make it unconscionable to forbid a
class action claim? Also, where does the answer to that question leave the
mandate to arbitrate? A recent case decided in the First Circuit attempted to
address these questions. 5
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On April 20, 2006, the First Circuit, in Kristian v. Comeast Corp., held
that a class action waiver in an antitrust 6 claim was unenforceable. 7 The court
* Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 2006).
Samuel Estreicher & Steven C. Bennett, Recent Rulings on Class-Action Waivers
in Arbitration Agreements, N.Y.L.J. ONLINE, June 10, 2005, http://www.nylj.com.
2 The Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2000). "The Federal Arbitration
Act provides for enforcement in federal courts of agreements made to arbitrate future
disputes arising in maritime transactions, and in disputes growing out of interstate or
foreign commerce." 4 AM. JUR. 2D Alternative Dispute Resolution § 115 (2006).
3 Estreicher & Bennett, supra note 1.
4 Carnegie v. Household Int'l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004) (emphasis in
original).
5 Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25 (Ist Cir. 2006).
6 Antitrust law deals with "[t]he body of law designed to protect trade and commerce
from restraints, monopolies, price-fixing, and price discrimination. The principal federal
antitrust laws are the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-7) and the Clayton Act (15
U.S.C.A. §§ 12-27)." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 38 (2d pocket ed. 2001).
7 Kristian, 446 F.3d at 29.
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explained that the class action ban was "invalid because [it] prevent[ed] the
vindication of statutory rights under state and federal law."8
The plaintiffs in the case were a group of cable subscribers in the Boston
area 9 who received their cable service from the defendant company, Comcast
Corporation.' 0 The plaintiffs claimed that the defendant had violated both
state and federal antitrust laws, which attempt to control grossly inflated
prices, by participating in "anticompetitive practices."'II They alleged that
Comcast had engaged in conduct that "exclude[d], prevent[ed] or
interfere[ed] with competition."' 12 Plaintiffs specifically noted Comcast's
refusal to provide programming access to competitors in the area.13 The
plaintiffs attempted to initiate a class action claim to represent Comcast
customers in the Boston area from December 1999 to the present. 14
When the plaintiffs first subscribed for cable services, their agreement
with Comcast contained no arbitration provision.' 5 A provision to arbitrate
was not added to the terms of the agreement until 2001.16 Notice of the new
provision was contained in the "terms and conditions" information given to
subscribers at the time of installation and also provided annually thereafter. 17
The plaintiffs were sent information regarding the new addition to the
terms and conditions section with their subscriber's invoice during the
November 2001 billing cycle.' 8 Another arbitration clause, with significant
changes from the original provision, was sent in 2002.19 The arbitration
provision remained essentially unchanged from 2002 to 2003.20 When sued,
8Id.
9 Id. at 30. The plaintiffs included Boston area Comcast Corporation customers
James D. Masterman, Paul Pinella, Jack Rogers, and Martha Kristian.
10 Id. The plaintiffs subscribed for cable services through Comcast Corporation
predecessors in 1987, 1991, 1994, and 1999, respectively.
I Id.
12 Id.
13 Kristian, 446 F.3d at 30.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Id. The "terms and conditions" of the subscriber's policy (including changes and
additions made to the original agreement) are included in the "Policies & Practices"
section. Id. Copies of this section are included in the subscriber's invoice as a billing
stuffer during the November-December billing cycle. Id.
18 Id.
19 Kristian, 446 F.3d at 30.
20 Id.
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Comcast sought to enforce the mandate to arbitrate pursuant to the terms of
the agreement contained in the 2002-2003 provisions.21
Two of the plaintiffs involved in the present action filed a complaint
against Comcast and AT&T Broadband in Massachusetts State Court.22 They
alleged that the defendants had violated the Massachusetts Antitrust Act.23
Comcast removed the action to the U.S. District Court for the District of
Massachusetts. 24 The two other plaintiffs also filed a claim against Comcast
in the same district court alleging that Comcast violated provisions of the
Clayton Antitrust Act.25
Comcast filed motions to compel arbitration in both cases. 26 Ultimately,
the district court refused to enforce the arbitration agreement set forth in the
"Policies & Practices" section sent to plaintiffs in 2002 and 2003.27 The trial
court decided that the arbitration provision did not apply because the alleged
actions by the defendant that gave rise to the plaintiffs' claim preceded the
notification of the new policy in 2002.28
21 Id.
22 Kristian, 446 F.3d at 30. Jack Rogers and Paul Pinella filed the complaint against
Comcast and AT&T Broadband in Massachusetts State Court. Id.
23 Id. MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 93, §§ 1-14A (2006).
24 Kristian, 446 F.3d at 30.
25 Id. at 30-31. Plaintiffs Martha Kristian and James D. Masterman filed the claim
against Comcast alleging violations of the Clayton Antitrust Act. Id.
26 Id. at 31.
27 Id.
28 Kristian, 446 F.3d at 31-32. Based on the language of the arbitration provision in
the 2002 and 2003 mailings, the court decided that the provision did not apply
retroactively to actions by Comcast before the new arbitration provision was introduced.
The language of the agreement at issue was the following:
IF WE ARE UNABLE TO RESOLVE INFORMALLY ANY CLAIM OR
DISPUTE RELATED TO OR ARISING OUT OF THIS AGREEMENT OR THE
SERVICES PROVIDED, WE HAVE AGREED TO BINDING ARBITRATION
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BELOW. YOU MUST CONTACT US WITHIN ONE
(1) YEAR OF THE DATE OF THE OCCURRENCE OF THE EVENT OR FACTS
GIVING RISE TO A DISPUTE... OR YOU WAIVE THE RIGHT TO PURSUE
A CLAIM BASED UPON SUCH EVENT, FACTS OR DISPUTE. THERE SHALL
BE NO RIGHT OR AUTHORITY FOR ANY CLAIMS TO BE ARBITRATED
ON A CLASS ACTION OR CONSOLIDATED BASIS OR ON BASES
INVOLVING CLAIMS BROUGHT BY A PURPORTED REPRESENTATIVE
CAPACITY ON BEHALF OF THE GENERAL PUBLIC (SUCH AS A PRIVATE
ATTORNEY GENERAL), OTHER SUBSCRIBERS, OR OTHER PERSONS
SIMILARLY SITUATED UNLESS YOUR STATE'S LAWS PROVIDE
OTHERWISE.
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Comcast then filed an appeal in both cases based upon the denial of its
motion to compel arbitration.29 The two cases, both concerning the
enforceability of arbitration provisions, were consolidated on appeal and
brought before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.30
III. THE COURT'S HOLDING AND REASONING
A. The Arbitration Clause's Applicability to the Present Dispute
The first task of the First Circuit was to decide whether the arbitration
clause was applicable to the present dispute.31 The district court held that the
provision did not apply retroactively and therefore did not apply to the
plaintiffs' claim. 32 The First Circuit evaluated the district court's holding.33
The lower court's first argument supporting the proposition that the
provision did not apply retroactively dealt with the language of the
arbitration provision itself.34 The provision referred to "any claim or dispute
related to or arising out of this agreement or the services provided. '35 The
phrase, "the services provided," following the phrase, "this agreement," led
the district court to believe that any disputes about service were limited to
those covered in that particular agreement and any disputes that arose before
the provision would not be covered by this language. 36 The district court
Id. at 32. To bolster its interpretation of the provision, the trial court distinguished several
cases where the language in an agreement was meant to have retroactive effect. Id. at 32.
The court reasoned that because the language of the Comcast contract did not resemble
the language of any of the other provisions named, it should be considered ambiguous
and "interpreted against Comcast in light of the policy of construing adhesion contracts
strictly against the drafter." Id. The district court found that the arbitration provision was
a contract of adhesion. Id.
29 Kristian, 446 F.3d at 31.
30 Id. at 31. The First Circuit evaluated the district court's refusal to compel
arbitration de novo. Id. The court stated, however, that in forming its decision it was "not
wedded to the lower court's rationale, but, rather, may affirm its order on any
independent ground made manifest by the record." Id.
31 Kristian, 446 F.3d at 31.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 31-32.
36 Id. at 32. In addition, the district court found that the use of "the" directly before
"services provided" supported the idea that it referred to services provided under "this
agreement." Id. The court found that the phrase "the services provided" referred to
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further supported this interpretation of the language of the provision by
distinguishing other cases where the language of the provision in question
was explicitly intended to have retroactive effect.37 For example, in Belke v.
Merrill Lynch, the agreement specifically applied to "any controversy
between us arising out of your business."38
The district court then noted the presence of the statute of limitations
provision in the agreement following the "services provided" language. 39
The district court reasoned that if the arbitration provision was retroactively
effective, then the one-year statute of limitations would automatically block
any claims that related to actions occurring within the year prior to the new
arbitration provision.40 The court found this was unlikely the intention of the
parties, as they had never before included an arbitration agreement in their
contract.
4 1
The First Circuit disagreed with the conclusion of the district court on the
retroactivity of the provision. 42 The First Circuit held that the arbitration
agreement applied retroactively.43 To support its holding, the court first
noted a large number of cases that dealt with arbitration agreements that
specifically excluded a retroactive effect.44 One example of a provision
found to have no retroactive effect was in Security Watch, Inc. v. Sentinel
Systems, Inc.45 The arbitration provision in that case stated "the parties shall
follow these dispute resolution processes in connection with all disputes,
controversies or claims ... arising out of or relating to the Products furnished
pursuant to this Agreement or acts or omissions of Distributor or AT&T
under this Agreement."'46 The Kristian court reasoned that if the parties
"specific services provided under the particular subscriber agreement at issue, and [did]
not refer to services in a general sense." Id.
37 Kristian, 446 F.3d at 32 (citing Belke v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
693 F.2d 1023, 1028 (11th Cir. 1982), overruled on other grounds by Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985)); Boulet v. Bangor Sec. Inc., 324 F. Supp.
2d 120, 125 (D. Me. 2004).
38 Kristian, 446 F.3d at 32 (citing Belke, 693 F.2d at 1028).
3 9 Kristian, 446 F.3d at 32-33.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 33.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44Id.; see, e.g., Security Watch, Inc. v. Sentinel Systems, Inc., 176 F.3d 369 (6th
Cir. 1999); Choice Security Systems, Inc. v. AT&T Corp., 141 F.3d 1149 (1st Cir. 1998).
45 Kristian, 446 F.3d at 33 (citing Security Watch, Inc., 176 F.3d at 372).
46 Id. (citing Security Watch, Inc., 176 F.3d at 372).
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wanted to prevent the provision from having retroactive effect, they could
have easily made that clear in the language of the agreement. 47
The First Circuit also dismissed the district court's argument relating to
the statute of limitations. 48 The circuit court noted that the provisions
regarding the statute of limitations had not changed significantly between the
2001 and 2002-2003 agreements. 49 Therefore enforcing the agreement
retroactively would not represent "a significant shift in the contractual
relationship." 50 The court also found that the 2001 version of the agreement
actually contained language that supported the idea of retroactivity: "Any
and all disputes... must be resolved by final and binding arbitration. This
includes any and all disputes based on any product, service or advertising
connected to the provision or use of the service." 51
B. Denial of Statutory Rights Through the Enforcement of the
Arbitration Agreement
The plaintiffs further argued that the arbitration provision prevented
them from "vindicating their statutory rights." 52 Although federal public
policy strongly supports the use of arbitration, the court held that it is only a
viable alternative to traditional litigation if it remains "a fair and adequate
mechanism for enforcing statutory rights. '53 Plaintiffs claimed that their
statutory rights were violated because the arbitration agreement (1) provided
for limited discovery, (2) shortened the statute of limitations, (3) barred
recovery of treble damages, (4) prevented the recovery of attorney's fees, and
(5) prohibited the use of class action mechanisms.54
In order to appropriately analyze each of the plaintiffs alleged statutory
rights violations, the court had to first decide whether the courts or the
47 Id.
48 Id. at 33-34.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 34.
51 Kristian, 446 F.3d at 34.
52 Id. at 37.
53 Id. (citing Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 170 F.3d 1,
14 (1st Cir. 1999)). The court further explained that "[u]nless the arbitral forum provided
by a given agreement provides for the fair and adequate enforcement of a party's
statutory rights, the arbitral forum runs afoul of this presumption [of arbitration as a fair
mechanism for enforcing statutory fights] and loses its claim as a valid alternative to
traditional litigation." Id.
54 Kristian, 446 F.3d at 37.
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arbitral forum provided the appropriate venue for the resolution of the
plaintiff's claims. 55 The court looked to the precedent established in Howsam
v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. to shed light on this question.56
In Howsam, the United States Supreme Court held that although there is
a strong federal policy favoring arbitration, "[t]he question whether the
parties have submitted a particular dispute to arbitration, i.e., the 'question of
arbitrability,' is an 'issue for judicial determination unless the parties clearly
and unmistakably provide otherwise.' 57 The appellate court looked at each
of the plaintiff's arguments to decide if there was in fact a "question of
arbitrability" or if the parties had clearly provided for the resolution of each
issue by the contract terms. 58
1. Limiting Discovery and Shortened Statute ofLimitations
The plaintiffs first argued that language in the contract limited the
amount of discovery that they could obtain compared to the amount of
discovery that they could receive if their dispute were handled in litigation.59
The court quickly disposed of this argument by citing the Supreme Court's
decision in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.60 In Gilmer, the Court
addressed an analogous issue in the context of an age discrimination case.61
Ultimately, the Court held that limited discovery could not be used "as a
ground for opposing the enforcement of an arbitration clause. '62 The
appellate court applied Gilmer to the plaintiffs' argument and decided that
based on this precedent, there was "no need to decide anew whether limited
discovery raises a question of arbitrability. It does not."'63
The plaintiffs also argued that the statutes of limitations in both the
federal and state antitrust acts,64 which provided for a four-year limit, were in
direct conflict with the statute of limitations contained in the arbitration
55 See id
56 Id. at 37-38; see Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79 (2002).
57 Howsam, 537 U.S. at 83 (quoting AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications
Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986)).
58 Kristian, 446 F.3d at 42.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 42-43, see Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
61 See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 20.
62 Kristian, 446 F.3d at 42 (citing Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 31).
63 Kristian, 446 F.3d at 42-43.
64 The Clayton Antitrust Act, § 15(b), 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-17 (2000); The
Massachusetts Antitrust Act, MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 93, § 13 (2006).
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agreement, which provided for a one-year limit. 65 The plaintiffs opposed the
defendant's motion to compel arbitration based upon the conflict between the
antitrust statutes and the arbitration agreement provisions. 66
The First Circuit held that this conflict did not raise a question of
arbitrability. 67 The court decided that a factual inquiry was required to
determine whether the plaintiffs had suffered from an ongoing injury based
upon the actions of the defendant, and whether such injury actually tolled the
statute of limitations provided for in the agreement. 68 This factual inquiry
dealing with the "merits of the case" was, according to the court, within the
"province of the arbitrator." 69 The court therefore concluded that since the
issues to be decided with regards to the statute of limitations were squarely
within "the purview of the arbitrator," the plaintiffs' challenge on these
grounds did not raise a question of arbitrability for the court. 70
2. Barring Recovery of Treble Damages
The plaintiffs also argued that there was a direct conflict between the
federal and state antitrust acts and the arbitration provision.71 The arbitration
agreement contained a clause that specifically stated that "In no event shall
we [Comcast] or our employees or our agents have any liability for punitive,
treble, exemplary, special, indirect, incidental or consequential
damages .... "72 At first blush, the clause appeared to be in direct conflict
with both antitrust statutes, which specially provided for the recovery of
treble damages.73 The court analyzed the federal and state antitrust statutes
separately due to a significant difference in language. 74 The federal law used
65 Kristian, 446 F.3d at 43.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 43-44.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 44. The court also held the statute of limitations in this case was an
affirmative defense that would also touch on the "merits of the case," again putting the
issue "in the purview of the arbitrator." Id.
70 Kristian, 446 F.3d at 44.
71 Id. at 44-45.
7 2 1d at44.
73 Id. at 44-45. Treble damages are "[d]amages that, by statute, are three times the
amount that the fact-finder determines is owed." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 171 (2d
pocket ed. 2001).
74 Kristian, 446 F.3d at 45.
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the term "shall" in its provision regarding the award of treble damages. 75 The
Massachusetts law, however, stated that the court "may" award treble
damages. 76
Following a lengthy analysis regarding the distinct language in both
statutes, the court held that with regard to the state antitrust statute claim
there was no question of arbitrability for the courts. 77 The First Circuit
concluded that based upon the language in the state statute, the awarding of
treble damages was a matter of discretion and not "an indispensable element
of Massachusetts' antitrust scheme."' 78 It would be the arbitrator's ultimate
decision whether the recovery of treble damages in the state antitrust claim
was waivable. 79
With regard to the federal antitrust statute, the court held that a question
of arbitrability existed because the language of the federal law clearly
conflicted with the language of the arbitration provision. 80 There was no
ambiguity to be deciphered by an arbitrator.81 The court also stated that "the
award of treble damages under the federal antitrust statutes cannot be
waived." 82
If the two provisions were found to conflict, the plaintiffs may have
prevailed on their statutory rights claim. 83 The court, however, found a
"savings clause" in the arbitration agreement.84 The savings clause stated that
75 Id. The Clayton Act states in part:
[a]ny person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything
forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefore in any district court of the United
States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent,
without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the
damages by him sustained ....
15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2000) (emphasis added).
76 Kristian, 446 F.3d at 45. The Massachusetts antitrust statute states in part: "[I]f
the court finds that the violation was engaged in with malicious intent to injure said
person, the court may award up to three times the amount of actual damages sustained,
together with the costs of suit." MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93, § 12 (2006) (emphasis added).
77 Kristian, 446 F.3d at 50.
78 Id. at 49-50.
79 Id. at 49-50.
80 Id. at 47.
81Id. at45.
82 Id. at48.
83 Kristian, 446 F.3d at 48.
84 Id.
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even if the law did not permit the waiver of one of the statutory remedies,
that portion could essentially be ignored and the rest of the agreement would
remain enforceable. 85 Therefore the court decided that although there was a
question of arbitrability with regard to the federal antitrust law, and the
provisions of that law and the arbitration agreement were clearly in conflict,
the savings clause nullified the provision and allowed the appellate court to
enforce the remainder of the document. 86 This result essentially provided the
plaintiffs with the right to receive treble damages.8 7
3. Preventing Recovery of Attorney's Fees
The plaintiffs next argued that they were unable to vindicate their
statutory rights because the arbitration agreement contained a provision that
disallowed their recovery of attorney's fees.88 The First Circuit found this
provision was in direct conflict with both the federal and state laws that
provided for plaintiffs' recovery of attorney's fees and costs in antitrust
cases.
89
The court delved into the policies behind this provision, including the
potentially prohibitive costs involved in arbitrating an antitrust claim on an
individual basis. 90 In the district court, the plaintiffs brought in witnesses to
attest to the extraordinarily high costs associated with an antitrust claim.91
The court decided that the declarations by the plaintiffs' witnesses
"establish[ed] that the pursuit of Plaintiffs' antitrust claims will require a
A 'savings clause' preemptively resolves conflicts between contract language
and applicable law in order to preserve the remaining, non-conflicting contract
language. 'Savings clause' is somewhat of a misnomer. The contractual language in
conflict with applicable law is not saved. The non-conflicting language is saved ....
In essence, a savings clause serves as an expression of the intent of the parties that
limits the remedies an arbitrator or court may use in situations of conflict between
contract terms and applicable law.
Id. at 48 n.16.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Kristian, 446 F.3d at 50. The provision also disallows the recovery of expert
witness fees. Id.
89 Id.; see 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2006); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93 § 12 (2006).
90 Kristian, 446 F.3d at 51-52.
91 Id. at 52.
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huge outlay of financial resources." 92 The court noted that if "the plaintiff
cannot afford to arbitrate because of an inability to recover attorney's fees
and costs, the plaintiff is essentially deprived of any dispute resolution forum
whatsoever." 93
The First Circuit decided that, with regards to the attorney's fees, the
plaintiffs had raised a question of arbitrability. 94 The court, however, again
looked to a savings clause in the agreement. 95 In the contract, a section
entitled "Enforceability and Survival" stated that "if any portion of these
Policies and Practices is determined to be illegal or unenforceable, then the
remainder of such Policies and Practices shall be given full force and
effect."'96 The court ultimately decided that the plaintiffs were able to recover
attorney's fees and costs in arbitration because the savings clause severed
this unenforceable section and "saved" the rest of the document mandating
arbitration.97
4. Prohibiting the Use of the Class Action Provision
The plaintiffs' final argument supporting their claim that the arbitration
agreement had taken away their ability to vindicate their statutory rights dealt
with the class action waiver contained in the agreement. 98 The language of
the arbitration agreement stated that: "There shall be no right or authority for
any claims to be arbitrated on a class action or consolidated basis or on bases
involving claims brought in a purported representative capacity on behalf of
the general public .... ."99
92 Id.
93 Id. at 51.
94 Id. at 52-53. Comcast argued that more evidence of prohibitive costs was needed
regarding the plaintiff's burden in an antitrust case and that the language in the arbitration
provision did not disallow the plaintiff from recovering attorney's fees. Id. The court
rejected both of these arguments based on the plethora of evidence offered regarding the
exorbitant fees involved in antitrust cases and that the language in the arbitration
agreement clearly denied the plaintiff the opportunity to recover attorney's fees. Id.
95 Id. at 53.
96 Kristian, 446 F.3d at 53. This language was located in the 2002 and 2003 version
of the Policies & Practices section sent to the plaintiffs. Id.
97 Id. The court held that "[their] conclusion on Plaintiff's vindication of statutory
rights claim based on the bar against attorney's fees and costs parallel[ed] [their]
conclusion [with] regards to Plaintiffs vindication of statutory rights claim based on
treble damages mandated by federal antitrust law."
98 Id.
99 Id.
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Comcast claimed that this provision, which serves as a class action
waiver, should be viewed as a procedural issue, and thus should be left for
the arbitrator to interpret.' 00 The First Circuit, however, disagreed with that
assessment. 10 1 The language in the agreement explicitly forbade the use of a
class action mechanism.1 02 As a result, there was no ambiguity for the
arbitrator to decide as to whether the agreement definitively barred the use of
class wide arbitration.103
After deciding that the dispute regarding the class action mechanism was
not within the purview of the arbitrator, the court turned to the question of
whether it violated any of the plaintiffs' statutory rights. 104 The court found
that the class action waiver did not violate the state or federal antitrust laws,
which do not mention the class action mechanism. 10 5 The court did find,
however, that the waiver violated the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
which do provide for class actions.10 6
The court further noted the usefulness of a class action mechanism,
stating that "[t]he bar on class arbitration threatens the premise that
arbitration can be 'a fair and adequate mechanism for enforcing statutory
rights." ' 10 7 It noted that the plaintiffs' expert's fees could be in the hundreds
of thousands of dollars, and attorney's fees could easily reach millions of
dollars in an antitrust case. 108 The court reasoned that with these
extraordinarily high costs, it was extremely unlikely that a plaintiff could or
would be able to bring a claim alone. 10 9 Therefore, with the class action ban
100 Id.
101 Id. at 53-54.
102 Kristian, 446 F.3d at 53-54.
103 Id. (citing Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 451 (2003)). The
First Circuit distinguished the present case from Bazzle because in Bazzle the agreement
was silent with regards to the class action mechanism. Kristian, 446 F.3d at 53.
Therefore, it was within the duties of the arbitrator to decide whether the agreement did,
in fact, forbid the use of the class wide arbitration. In the present case, however, the
language in the arbitration agreement clearly and unmistakably prohibited the use of the
class action mechanism in arbitration. Kristian, 446 F.3d at 53-54.
104 Kristian, 446 F.3d at 54.
105 Id.
106 Id.; see FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
107 Kristian, 446 F.3d at 54 (citing Rosenberg, 170 F.3d at 14).
108 Kristian, 446 F.3d at 54-55.
109 Id.
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in place, the plaintiff was essentially unable to "vindicate [their] statutory
rights in arbitration."' 10
Although the First Circuit found that the class action ban did conflict
with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it nonetheless found a way to
separate this ban from the rest of the provisions and enforce the rest of the
agreement."I' The court looked again to a savings clause in the language of
the agreement. 112 The provision, added in the 2002 version of the arbitration
agreement, stated that "there shall be no right or authority for any claims to
be arbitrated on a class action or consolidated basis... unless your state's
laws provide otherwise.""13 Essentially, this language allowed the court to
sever the class action ban from the rest of the document while still enforcing
the mandate to arbitrate.14
C. Summary of the Court's Decision
The First Circuit first decided that, contrary to the conclusion of the
district court, the arbitration agreement did apply retroactively and therefore
covered the dispute in this case.1 15 The court then evaluated the plaintiffs'
other arguments regarding the vindication of their statutory rights. 116 With
regard to their limited discovery, statute of limitations, and state law treble
damages claims, the court decided that a question of arbitrability was not
ultimately raised.1 7 The court then turned to the federal treble damages,
attorney's fees, and class action ban claims, deciding that there was, in fact, a
question of arbitrability."18 The court found in each case, however, that the
11°Id at 55 (quoting Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90
(2000)).
111 Kristian, 446 F.3d at 61.
112 Id.
"13 Id
114 Comcast argued that although the language seemed clear, it did not attempt to
make the class action ban severable from the rest of the agreement. Id. The court,
however, dismissed this argument, finding that the language was clear and the ban was
severable. Kristian, 446 F.3d at 62. The court further explained, "[a]pparently, Comcast
has simply changed its mind about the severability of the class arbitration bar. We are
unaware of any principle of contract law that permits disregard of a contract provision on
the basis of second thoughts by a contracting party." Id. at 62.
115 Id. at 64.
116 Id.
117 Kristian, 446 F.3d at 64.
18 Id
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unenforceable provision was severable from the rest of the arbitration
agreement by a savings clause also found in the document." 19
Therefore, based upon the decision of this court, the plaintiffs were still
obliged to arbitrate, but could do so on a class action basis. 120 Additionally,
they would have an opportunity to recover treble damages and attorney's fees
and costs. 121 The First Circuit ultimately held that "the district court's
holding that the arbitration clause in the 2002/2003 Policies & Practices, in
its entirety, does not apply to Plaintiffs' antitrust claims is reversed."'1 22 The
court then remanded for further proceedings.123
IV. THE IMPACT OF THE COURT'S HOLDING
A. Departure from Precedent
The decision in Kristian serves as a great departure from the precedent
set in most circuits. 124 In rendering its decision, the First Circuit noted that
the Third, Fourth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits have all enforced consumer
arbitration agreements barring the use of a class action mechanism. 125 The
Kristian court, however, noted two important distinctions. 126 One distinction
was that in the other cases, the attorney's fees and costs were either
recoverable by the plaintiff or a moot issue. 127 For example, in Johnson v.
West Suburban Bank, the Third Circuit stated, "nor will arbitration
necessarily choke off the supply of lawyers willing to pursue claims on
behalf of debtors."128
119M
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 id. at 64-65.
123 Kristian, 446 F.3d at 65.
124 Id. at 55.
125 Id.
126 Id. at 55-56.
127 Id. at 56. Ultimately, the court also decided that attorney's fees and costs should
be recoverable by the plaintiffs. It enforced this provision by utilizing a "savings clause"
located in the Policies & Practices section to remove the unenforceable provision
regarding attorney's fees. Id.
128 Id. (quoting Johnson v. West Suburban Bank, 225 F.3d 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2000)).
In another case, the defendant had already agreed to pay all arbitration costs. Livingston
v. Associates Fin., Inc., 339 F.3d 553, 557 (7th Cir. 2003).
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The second distinction was that the other cases that chose to enforce the
bar on class actions all dealt with plaintiffs' claims against banks or other
financial lenders under the Truth in Lending Act (TILA). 129 Kristian found
that distinction particularly important because of the "sheer complexity" of
arbitrating an antitrust case as opposed to a TILA case. 130 The court noted
that a TILA claim typically deals with one transaction.131 On the other hand,
to determine whether there has been an antitrust violation, a court must often
answer a "complicated question of fact."' 32
The First Circuit also emphasized the extraordinary expense of
prosecuting an antitrust case. 133 The court estimated that expert's fees could
cost between $300,000-$600,000 and attorney's fees could go into the
hundreds of thousands of dollars. 134 With the high costs of antitrust
arbitration it would be nearly impossible for a plaintiff to bring a suit
alone. 135 Based on the cost and complexity of an antitrust case, the Kristian
court concluded that the rationale for enforcing a class action ban in this case
did not exist as it may have in the other circuit court cases involving
primarily TILA violations. 136
Although Kristian seemed to depart from the precedent on the issue of
class action bans, the First Circuit did cite a few cases that were in line with
its reasoning. 137 Although the cases mentioned concerned the refusal to
compel arbitration on state unconscionability grounds, Kristian held that
much of the reasoning behind those decisions was applicable to the current
context. 138 The court primarily relied on the decisions in Discover Bank v.
129 Kristian, 446 F.3d at 57. The Truth in Lending Act of 1968, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-
1693 (2000), was seen as a great victory for consumers. The Act was designed to "assure
a meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer will be able to compare
more readily the various credit terms available to him and avoid the uniformed use of
credit, and to protect the consumer against inaccurate and unfair credit billing and credit
card practices." 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a).
130 Kristian, 446 F.3d at 57.
131 Id.
13 2 Id. at 58.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 Id. In addition, the plaintiffs' experts testified that if the plaintiffs went alone, an
individual recovery in this case, despite the extraordinary costs, would only "range from
a few hundred dollars to a few thousand dollars." Id.
136 Kristian, 446 F.3d at 58.
137 Id. at 60.
13 8 Id.
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Superior Court and Ting v. AT&T. 139 In Discover Bank, the California
Supreme Court observed "class actions and arbitrations are, particularly in
the consumer context, often inextricably linked to the vindication of
substantive rights."' 40
In Ting, the plaintiffs brought a claim against AT&T. 141 According to
their consumer service agreement, the plaintiffs were barred from bringing
the action on a class wide basis. 142 Kristian cited approvingly to the Ninth
Circuit's rationale that the extraordinary costs in these types of cases
supported a class action mechanism. 143 The Kristian court stated that "it
would not have been economically feasible to pursue the claims in these
cases on an individual basis, whether the case was brought in court or
arbitration."' 44
Essentially, Ting held that without the class action mechanism, the
plaintiffs would have no feasible way to redress their dispute. 145 This is in
line with the conclusion of Kristian: "[I]f the class mechanism prohibition
here is enforced, Comcast will be essentially shielded from private consumer
antitrust enforcement liability, even in cases where it has violated the law.
Plaintiffs will be unable to vindicate their statutory rights."' 146
B. Effect of the Decision
The ultimate effect of this proconsumer case is difficult to predict.' 47
Much of its effect will be determined by the interpretation of its scope in the
future. 148 Some argue that Kristian represents a significant departure in the
case precedent enforcing class action waivers and will change the direction
of the decisions in these consumer arbitration cases. 149 Others argue that this
decision invites a case-by-case analysis of whether the particular dispute
"precludes the effective vindication of statutory claims if the case is
139 See Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. 4th 148 (2005); Ting v. AT&T,
319 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2003).
14 0 Kristian, 446 F.3d at 60 (citing Discover Bank, 36 Cal. 4th at 161).
141 Ting, 319 F.3d at 1126.
142 Kristian, 446 F.3d at 60 (citing Ting, 319 F.3d at 1130).
143 Kristian, 446 F.3d at 60.
144 Id. at 60 (citing Ting v. AT&T, 182 F. Supp. 2d 902, 918 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
145 Kristian, 446 F.3d at 60-61.
14 6 Id. at61.
147 Estreicher & Bennet, supra note 1.
148 Id.
149 Id.
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arbitrated on an individual basis."' 50 This analysis would depend on the
complexity of the issues and the possible cost of expert testimony and
attorney's fees. 151
Kristian critics argue that if future courts adopt the case-by-case analysis,
the additional inquiry may incur costs that negate the low-cost benefits of
arbitration. 152 Furthermore, if this additional inquiry is added to the
formalities, the shortened time frame of arbitration, which is also appealing
to the parties, may be extended. 53 Critics wonder if the cost and time of
arbitration increases will reduce the incentive for parties, particularly large
corporations, to include these arbitration agreements in their contracts.' 54
Does this go against the federal public policy supporting arbitration? 155
The U.S. Chamber of Commerce stated in an amicus brief that:
"Superimposing a class action requirement onto contractual agreements to
arbitrate individually will effectively eliminate the virtues of arbitration,
while multiplying the stakes exponentially. The risk to businesses of
litigating a class action in the arbitral forum is simply too high ....
Yet some argue that it would actually be in the best interest of large
corporations to insist on going to court because of the dependability of the
rules of evidence and the ability to appeal. 157 However, even if the benefits
of arbitration-namely cost and a shorter time commitment-remain intact,
some argue that there are still benefits in bringing the case to court. 158 As one
commentator recognized, "some of the biggest cases with the greatest social
importance were class actions. What would the world be like if these cases
couldn't be brought or if they were brought privately, with no opinion issued,
and no understanding of exactly what happened or why?"' 59
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 Estreicher & Bennett, supra note 1.
154 Id.
155 Id.
156 Allison Torres Burtka, Courts Weigh in on Class Action Bans in Arbitration
(Sept. 1, 2006), http://thepeoplesfirm.com/news/news item.asp?NEWSID=907 (citing
Brief for Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioner, Cingular Wireless v. Mendoza, cert. denied, 126 S.Ct. 2353,
(mem.) (2006) (No. 05-1119), 2006 WL 1267576).
157 1d. Myriam Gilles, a professor at Cardozo School of Law in New York City,
adds "[t]hat's a hard thing to explain to your shareholders: why you've lost a huge
judgment that you can't appeal." Id.
158 Id.
159 Id.
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
V. CONCLUSION
As many commentators have noted, the law in this area is far from
decided, and the impact of Kristian is far from realized. On the one hand, the
decision is seen as a great victory for consumers, allowing them to bring
claims that financially they may not have been able to bring with the class
action ban in place. 160 However, many critics argue that the possible
downside of this decision is its strain on the process of arbitration. 16 1 Will
this decision serve to increase the costs and time commitment of arbitration
to such a level that the benefits of arbitration are overshadowed? 162 What
about the future of this decision? Some observers speculate that this
landmark decision, which sided the First Circuit with the minority circuit
position on this issue, will serve as the catalyst for an appeal to the Supreme
Court. 163 One thing is certain in dealing with class action waivers, "[t]he
stakes of this issue are huge."'164
Kate Reichert
160 Burtka, supra note 156.
161 Estreicher & Bennett, supra note 1.
162 Id.
163 ADR Institute Editor, First Circuit Relies on Preclusion of Statutory Remedy in
Arbitration Clause to Prohibit Clause's Class Action Waiver for Antitrust Claims,
ADRInstitute.org, May 5, 2006,
http://www.adrinstitute.org/edit/2006/May/050506Kristianv.ComcastCorp.htm.
164 Burtka, supra note 156.
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